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1. Introduction 
It is good management practice to acquire informa 
tion before committing the firm to an important deci 
sion or a major investment. External sources of such 
information include marketing and strategic consul 
tants, legal advisors, information technology (IT) con 
sultants, financial research firms, auditors, and the 
growing number of information services companies 
that offer electronic access to proprietary databases. 
Individuals also solicit information from a variety 
of sources before taking important decisions. For 
instance, buyers of used cars sometimes invest in a 
diagnostic check by a trusted mechanic or acquire 
online information about the specific model and the 
history of the vehicle from a service such as Carfax. 
Other examples include property evaluation by real 
estate experts, medical advice, and legal counsel. 
This paper analyzes how to price diagnostic infor 
mation, which is defined as information that is: 
(1) valuable for making decisions, and (2) unbun 
dled from physical objects, services, and execution. 
In some cases, diagnostic information comes bundled 
with execution. For instance, doctors, IT consultants, 
and management consultants are typically paid both 
for diagnosing the problem and also for solving it. 
Similarly, many accounting and audit products both 
scan for errors and also rectify them. We do not deal 
with these cases here. In a seminal paper, Arrow 
(1962) modeled (diagnostic) information as a signal 
that changes the estimates of the probabilities of the 
different states of nature, allowing an informed agent 
to make better decisions. Arrow's work provides a 
crucial insight: Diagnostic information has economic 
value only insofar as the decision maker changes his 
actions as a consequence of the revised probabilities 
in at least one state of the world.1 
From a practical viewpoint, how information ser 
vices are priced is important. Selling information that 
is later used in decision making is a growing business 
(Jensen 1991). Professional consulting services are 
exemplars of the growing importance of the diagnos 
tic information market, which has increased at more 
than 10% a year during the 1980s. Marketing research 
consultants have the lion's share of the industry. 
The top 50 U.S. market research firms reported 
worldwide revenues of $5.96 billion in 1998. Mar 
ket research analysts held about 135,000 jobs in the 
United States in 2002, with employment expected to 
grow by more than 36% through 2012 (http://www. 
bls.gov). Market research firms provide clients with 
1 
Information, in addition to affecting the estimates of the proba 
bilities of the different states of nature, can also help identify new 
alternatives that were unknown a priori. Although this is an impor 
tant component of the value of information, scholars have tended 
to disregard it because of the difficulty of putting a value on a 
priori nonexisting states of nature. In this paper, we will follow 
in this tradition and focus on information as 
modifying estimated 
probabilities of known states of the world. 
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1. Introduction
It is good management practice to acquire informa-
tion before committing the firm to an important deci-
sion or a major investment. External sources of such
information inc1ude marketing and strategic consul-
tants, legal advisors, information technology (IT) con-
sultants, financial research firms, auditors, and the
growing number of information services companies
that offer electronic a cess to proprietary databases.
Individuals also solicit information from a variety
of sources before taking important decisions. For
instance, buyers of used cars sometimes invest in a
diagnostic check by a trusted mechanic or acquire
online information about the specific model and the
history of the vehic1e from a service such as Carfax.
Other examples inc1ude property evaluation by real
estate experts, medical advice, and legal counsel.
This paper analyzes how to price diagnostic infor-
mation, w ich is defined as information that is:
(1) valuable for making decisions, and (2) unbun-
dled from physical objects, services, and execution.
In sorne cases, diagnostic information comes bundled
with execution. For instance, doctors, IT consultants,
and management consultants are typically paid both
for diagnosing the problem and also for solving it.
Similarly, many accounting and audit products both
scan for errors and also rectify them. We do not deal
with these ca es here. In a seminal paper, Arrow
(1962) modeled (diagnostic) information as a signal
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that changes the estimates of the probabilities of the
different states of nature, allowing an informed agent
to make better decisions. Arrow's work provides a
crucial insight: Diagnostic information has econornic
value only insofar as the decision maker changes his
actions as a consequence of the revised probabilities
in at least one state of the world.1
From a practical viewpoint, how information ser-
vices are priced is important. Selling information that
is later used in decision making is a growing business
(Jensen 1991). Professional consulting services are
exemplars of the growing importance of the diagnos-
tic information market, which has increased at more
than 10% ayear during the 1980s. Marketing research
consultants have the lion's share of the industry.
The top 50 U.s. market research firms reported
worldwide revenues of $5.96 billion in 1998. Mar-
ket research analysts held about 135,000 jobs in the
United States in 2002, with employment expected to
grow by more than 36% through 2012 (http://www.
bls.gov). Market research firms provide c1ients with
1 lnformation, in addition to affecting the estimates of the proba-
bilities of the different states of nature, can also help identify new
alternatives that were unknown a priori. Although this is an impor-
tant eomponent of the value of information, seholars have tended
to disregard it beeause of the diffieulty of putting a value on a
priori nonexisting states of nature. In this paper, we will follow
in this tradition and foeus on information as modifying estimated
probabilities of known states of the world.
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information to decide on the promotion, distribution, 
design, and pricing of products or services. Marketing 
information may also be used in decisions such as 
adding new product lines or opening new branches. 
Other examples of diagnostic information include 
opinion services by portfolio analysts, legal counsel 
ing without further representation, and patent valid 
ity or patent infringement opinions by lawyers.2 For 
simplicity, in what follows we shall simply use infor 
mation to mean diagnostic information. 
To focus on how pricing is affected by the value 
of information, we develop a simple model where 
an agent has to decide whether or not to invest in 
a project with an uncertain outcome and can pur 
chase information that will update his beliefs about 
the outcome. The value of information is the differ 
ence in expected payoffs with and without it. Infor 
mation buyers are assumed to be heterogeneous in the 
ex ante success probability. We show that the value 
of information is nonmonotonic in the ex ante suc 
cess probability. Indeed, information is more valuable 
to buyers who have the highest a priori uncertainty 
between investing in the project or not. 
We then analyze the optimal pricing for a monopo 
list offering a single information quality. Our model's 
simplifying features, namely that all buyers invest the 
same amount (if they invest) and receive the same 
payoff (if the project is successful), imply that we 
can restrict ourselves to linear contracts. The optimal 
menu of contracts is remarkably simple. If negative 
payments are not allowed, a pure royalty is offered 
to buyers with low ex ante success probability and a 
pure fixed fee is offered to buyers with high ex ante 
success probability. The fact that the optimal menu 
of contracts collapses to only two contracts is due to 
both the linearity of contracts and the piecewise lin 
earity of the value of information. To grasp the intu 
ition behind our finding, note that whereas a pure 
fixed fee implies that the payment for the informa 
tion is independent of the ex ante expected value of 
the project, a royalty means that the payment is con 
tingent on the success of the project and therefore 
increasing in its ex ante expected value. A contingent 
payment is therefore especially ill suited to capture 
value from buyers with high ex ante expected value 
projects, for whom information is not that important. 
The simplicity of the optimal menu of contracts has 
important practical implications. It explains why we 
do not observe complex pricing schemes for selling 
information. Managers do not have to search for elab 
orate and complex formulae; instead, they need focus 
only on finding the optimal values for the royalty 
and fixed fee. Of course, these implications apply 
to those information markets whose reality approxi 
mates the special features of our model. For simplic 
ity, we ignore whether the information is sold as a 
service or embodied in a software or hardware diag 
nostic tool, which may affect whether the buyer can 
"resell" the information to others. The way in which 
information is sold may also affect the cost structure 
of the seller. We follow the literature in assuming that 
the marginal cost of serving an additional buyer is 
zero. In the next section, we position our paper in the 
context of the related literature. Section 3 derives the 
value of diagnostic information. Section 4 analyzes 
optimal pricing in the basic model with homogenous 
information, whereas ?5 explores the robustness of 
the basic result to extensions and generalizations. Sec 
tion 6 concludes the paper. The appendix, available 
online (http://mansci.pubs.informs.org/ecompanion. 
html), contains the proofs. 
2. Related Literature 
This paper is related to several streams of the manage 
rial and economic literature. Within the information 
marketing literature, the papers closest to ours are 
Iyer and Soberman (2000) and Chang and Jevons Lee 
(1994), which analyze the optimal selling and pricing 
policies for a marketing consultant who sells infor 
mation that increases the value of the downstream 
products. Because buyers' characteristics are common 
knowledge (an assumption we relax in our paper), 
the consultant can extract the full value of informa 
tion from each buyer. However, because buyers inter 
act in the product market, their willingness to pay 
depends upon which other buyers also have the infor 
mation. Thus, the optimal pricing scheme consists of 
selecting the subset of buyers to whom to sell infor 
mation. By contrast, we ignore interactions in the 
downstream market and focus on information that is 
nonrival and can be used by several buyers without 
loss of value. Formally, we assume that the values 
that buyers derive from information are independent. 
This implies that our analysis does not directly apply 
to cases where exclusive access to the information is 
an 
advantage. In turn, our paper derives the value 
of information from the underlying characteristics of 
the investment project and generates greater insights 
about the contractual mechanisms upon which a mar 
ket for information is based. 
To the best of our knowledge, the only paper 
that has explicitly modeled diagnostic information is 
Sarvary (2002). He looks at the market for second 
2 Firms often consult patent lawyers to assess whether their prod 
uct infringes on another's patent, or if another patent is valid, or 
both. The lawyers that provide such opinions are almost always 
not employed by the firm, and moreover, typically will not repre 
sent the firm if the latter is sued for patent infringement (Lemley 
and Tangri 2003). 
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information to decide on the promotion, distribution,
design, and pricing of products or services. Marketing
information may also be used in decisions such as
adding new product lines or opening new branches.
Other examples of diagnostic information include
opinion services by portfolio analysts, legal counsel-
ing without further representation, and patent valid-
ity or patent infringement opinions by lawyers.2 For
simplicity, in what follows we shall simply use infor-
mation to mean diagnostic information.
To focus on how pricing is affected by the value
of information, we develop a simple model where
an agent has to decide whether or not to invest in
a project with an uncertain outcome and can pur-
chase information that will update his beliefs about
the outcome. The value of information is the differ-
ence in expected payoffs with and without it. Infor-
mation buyers are assumed to be heterogeneous in the
ex ante success probability. We show that the value
of information is nonmonotonic in the ex ante suc-
cess probability. Indeed, information is more valuable
to buyers who have the highest a priori uncertainty
between investing in the project or not.
We then analyze the optimal pricing for a monopo-
list offering a single information quality. Our model's
simplifying features, namely that all buyers invest the
same amount (if they invest) and receive the same
payoff (if the project is successful), imply that we
can restrict ourselves to linear contracts. The optimal
menu of contracts is remarkably simple. If negative
payments are not allowed, a pure royalty is offered
to buyers with low ex ante success probability and a
pure fixed fee is offered to buyers with high ex ante
success probability. The fact that the optimal menu
of contracts collapses to only two contracts is due to
both the linearity of contracts and the piecewise lin-
earity of the value of information. To grasp the intu-
ition behind our finding, note that whereas apure
fixed fee implies that the payment for the informa-
tion is independent of the ex ante expected value of
the project, a royalty means that the payment is con-
tingent on the success of the project and therefore
increasing in its ex ante expected value. A contingent
payment is therefore especially ill suited to capture
value from buyers with high ex ante expected value
projects, for whom information is not that important.
The simplicity of the optimal menu of contracts has
important practical implications. It explains why we
do not observe complex pricing schemes for selling
2 Firms often consult patent lawyers to assess whether their prod-
uct infringes on another's patent, or if another patent is valid, or
both. The lawyers that provide such opinions are almost always
not employed by the firm, and moreover, typically will not repre-
sent the firm if the latter is sued for patent infringement (Lemley
and Tangri 2003).
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information. Managers do not have to search for elab-
orate and complex formulae; instead, they need focus
only on finding the optimal values for the royalty
and fixed fee. Of course, these implications apply
to those information markets whose reality approxi-
mates the special features of our model. For simplic-
ity, we ignore whether the information is sold as a
service or embodied in a software or hardware diag-
nostic tool, which may affect whether the buyer can
"resell" the information to others. The way in w ich
information is sold may also affect the cost structure
of the seller. We follow the literature in assuming that
the marginal cost of serving an additional buyer is
zero. In the next section, we position our paper in the
context of the related literature. Section 3 derives the
value of diagnostic information. Section 4 analyzes
optimal pricing in the basic model with homogenous
information, whereas §5 explores the robustness of
the basic result to extensions and generalizations. Sec-
tion 6 concludes the papero The appendix, available
online (http://mansci.pubs.informs.org/ecompanion.
html), contains the proofs.
2. Related Literature
This paper is related to several streams of the manage-
rial and economic literature. Within the information-
marketing literature, the papers closest to ours are
Iyer and Soberman (2000) and Chang and Jevons Lee
(1994), which analyze the optimal selling and pricing
policies for a marketing consultant who sells infor-
mation that increases the value of the downstream
products. Because buyers' characteristics are co mon
knowledge (an assumption we relax in our paper),
the consultant can extract the full value of informa-
tion from each buyer. However, because buyers inter-
act in the product market, their willingness to pay
depends upon which other buyers also have the infor-
mation. Thus, the optimal pricing scheme consists of
selecting the subset of buyers to whom to sell infor-
mation. By contrast, we ignore interactions in the
downstream market and focus on information that is
nonrival and can be used by several buyers without
loss of value. Formally, we a sume that the values
that buyers derive from information are independent.
This implies that our analysis does not directly apply
to cases where exclusive a cess to the information is
an advantage. In turn, our paper derives the value
of information from the underlying characteristics of
the investment project and generates greater insights
about the contractual mechanisms upon which a mar-
ket for information is based.
To the best of our knowledge, the only paper
that has explicitly modeled diagnostic information is
Sarvary (2002). He looks at the market for second
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opinions and analyzes competition between informa 
tion sellers. He assumes that the sellers are differ 
entiated in that they offer information with different 
levels of precision and shows that there is an equi 
librium in which the low-quality seller sells first and 
then (depending on the signal received) the buyer can 
buy the high-quality information with some proba 
bility. Differently from our paper, he assumes com 
mon knowledge about the buyer's willingness to pay 
for the information and does not deal with pric 
ing issues. Competition among information sellers 
is also analyzed by Sarvary and Parker (1997) in a 
game-theoretic model that consists of two firms sell 
ing information to a population of buyers who are 
heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for informa 
tion quality. They analyze how the nature of compe 
tition is affected by the reliability of information and 
the correlation between different sources of informa 
tion. As we do, they assume that there are no interac 
tions in the downstream market. Unlike us, however, 
they ignore the possibility of offering a menu of 
contracts to buyers. In sum, within the information 
marketing literature, our paper is the first to analyze 
the optimal pricing mechanism for selling diagnostic 
information to heterogeneous buyers with privately 
known ex ante values for the information.3 
Pricing issues have also been addressed by the 
recent literature on "information products" or "dig 
ital products." Sundararajan (2004) analyzes optimal 
pricing of digital goods under incomplete information 
when both fixed-fee and royalty pricing are feasible. 
He shows that offering fixed-fee pricing in addition 
to a usage-based pricing scheme is always (weakly) 
profit improving. Jain and Kannan (2002) examine 
various pricing schemes for information products 
sold online. They look at three common pricing 
schemes for access to proprietary databases: connect 
time-based pricing, search-based pricing, and sub 
scription pricing. They show that search-based pricing 
is typically preferred to connect-time-based pricing, 
and that subscription pricing might be used in com 
bination with search-based pricing when the value 
of information varies across users. Although simi 
lar in spirit, our paper differs in three important 
aspects. First, we focus on the pricing of information 
in the Arrow sense: information that is unbundled 
from physical objects or services, whose value derives 
solely from improved decision making. Second, we 
derive the value of information, whereas they assign 
it. Third, we identify and characterize the optimal 
menu of contracts for the information seller, whereas 
they simply compare different pricing schemes.4 
3. A Model for Diagnostic 
Information 
Consider a consulting company (the consultant) sell 
ing reports to clients (the buyers) who use these 
reports to make decisions about investment projects.5 
Each buyer can only undertake one project, by invest 
ing a fixed amount I. Projects can either be good (G) 
or bad (B). A G project generates a (gross) return of 
V > 0, whereas a B project generates a return of 0. 
There is an ex ante probability q that a given project 
is of type G, and 1 
- 
q that it is of type B. 
An important ingredient of our model is that 
buyers are heterogeneous. We assume that buyers, 
indexed by q, are distributed according to the distri 
bution function F(q). We also assume that the sup 
port of F(q) is compact, f(q) is the density function, 
and that q e [0,1], The consultant does not observe q, 
which could reflect unobserved differences in the 
buyer's ability or unobserved differences in the mar 
ket conditions facing the buyer, but does observe its 
distribution F. One interpretation of q is as follows. 
Suppose that firms use heuristics to screen projects 
to cull less-promising ones. Projects are indexed by 
the probability of success, p, which has a distribution 
h(p). If a firm is able to screen out and reject projects 
with p < p*, then q = f ph(p)dp is the conditional 
expectation of the success probability associated with 
the set of projects that survive the screening process. 
Heterogeneity in the ability of the firms to screen out 
projects is represented by p*.6 
For instance, in the case of marketing research infor 
mation, V could be the net benefit of launching a new 
product, I the cost of adding a new line to the exist 
ing product offer, and q the ex ante probability that 
the new product will be successfully accepted by the 
final consumers. Without new information, a buyer 
3Raju and Roy (2000) use a game-theoretic model to study how 
industry characteristics moderate the effect of market information 
on firm profits. 
4 There are other related papers as well, albeit with a very different 
focus. For example, Bashyam (2000) analyzes duopolistic competi 
tion in the supply of information products, but focuses on the selec 
tion of the distribution channel?online versus CD-ROM?rather 
than the pricing mechanisms. Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) exam 
ine whether firms should bundle different information goods and 
charge one bundle price. 
5 The assumption of a monopolist information seller implies that 
there is a high fixed cost for acquiring and processing proprietary 
information and a negligible marginal cost for information dis 
semination. For instance, IMS International, a subsidiary set up by 
Dun & Bradstreet in 1954, is the leading supplier of proprietary 
information about the sales of pharmaceutical and other health care 
products (Chang and Jevons Lee 1994). 
6 
Alternatively, one can assume that the source of heterogeneity 
across buyers is V, the gross return of a successful project, which 
yields qualitatively similar results, but is analytically less tractable. 
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opinions and analyzes competition between informa-
tion sellers. He a sumes that the sellers are differ-
entiated in that they offer information with different
levels of precision and shows that there is an equi-
librium in which the low-quality seller sells first and
then (depending on the signal received) the buyer can
buy the high-quality information with sorne proba-
bility. Differently from our paper, he a sumes com-
mon knowledge about the buyer's willingness to pay
for the information and does not deal with pric-
ing issues. Competition among information sellers
is also analyzed by Sarvary and Parker (1997) in a
game-theoretic model that consists of two firms sell-
ing information to a population of buyers who are
heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for informa-
tion quality. They analyze how the nature of compe-
tition is affected by the reliability of information and
the correlation between different sources of informa-
tion. As we do, they assume that there are no interac-
tions in the downstream market. Unlike us, however,
they ignore the possibility of offering a menu of
contracts to buyers. In sum, within the information-
marketing literature, our paper is the first to analyze
the optimal pricing mechanism for selling diagnostic
information to heterogeneous buyers with privately
known ex ante values for the information.3
Pricing issues have also been addressed by the
recent literature on "information products" or "dig-
ital products." Sundararajan (2004) analyzes optimal
pricing of digital goods under incomplete information
when both fixed-fee and royalty pricing are feasible.
He shows that offering fixed-fee pricing in addition
to a usage-based pricing scheme is always (weakly)
profit improving. Jain and Kannan (2002) examine
various pricing schemes for information products
sold online. They look at three co mon pricing
schemes for a cess to proprietary databases: co nect-
time-based pricing, search-based pricing, and sub-
scription pricing. They show that search-based pricing
is typically preferred to connect-time-based pricing,
and that subscription pricing might be used in com-
bination with search-based pricing when the value
of information varies across users. Although simi-
lar in spirit, our paper differs in three important
aspects. First, we focus on the pricing of information
in the Arrow sense: information that is unbundled
from physical objects or services, whose value derives
solely from improved decision making. Second, we
derive the value of information, whereas they assign
it. Third, we identify and characterize the optimal
3 Raju and Roy (2000) use a game-theoretic model to study how
industry characteristics moderate the effect of market information
on firm profits.
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menu of contracts for the information seller, whereas
they simply compare different pricing schemes.4
3. A Model for Diagnostic
Information
Consider a consulting company (the consultant) sell-
ing reports to c1ients (the buyers) who use these
reports to make decisions about investment projects.5
Each buyer can only undertake one project, by invest-
ing a fixed amount l. Projects can either be good (G)
or bad (B). A G project generates a (gross) return of
V > O, whereas a B project generates a return of O.
There is an ex ante probability q that a given project
is of type G, and 1 - q that it is of type B.
An important ingredient of our model is that
buyers are heterogeneous. We a sume that buyers,
indexed by q, are distributed according to the distri-
bution function F(q). We also assume that the sup-
port of F(q) is compact, f(q) is the density function,
and that q E [O, 1]. The consultant does not observe q,
which could reflect unobserved differences in the
buyer's ability or unobserved differences in the mar-
ket conditions facing the buyer, but does observe its
distribution F. One interpretation of q is as follows.
Suppose that firms use heuristics to screen projects
to cull less-promising ones. Projects are indexed by
the probability of success, p, which has a distribution
h(p). If a firm is able to screen out and reject projects
with p < p*, then q = IpI, ph(p) dp is the conditional
expectation of the su cess probability associated with
the set of projects that survive the screening process.
Heterogeneity in the ability of the firms to screen out
projects is represented by p'.6
For instance, in the case of marketing research infor-
mation, V could be the net benefit of launching a new
product, 1 the cost of adding a new line to the exist-
ing product offer, and q the ex ante probability that
the new product will be successfully accepted by the
final consumers. Without new information, a buyer
4 There are other related papers as well, albeit with a very different
focus. For example, Bashyam (2000) analyzes duopolistic competi-
tion in the supply of information products, but focuses on the selec-
tion of the distribution channel-online versus CD-RüM-rather
than the pricing mechanisms. Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) exam-
ine whether firms should bundle different information goods and
charge one bundle price.
5 The assumption of a monopolist information seller implies that
there is a high fixed cost for acquiring and processing proprietary
information and a negligible marginal cost for information dis-
semination. For instance, I S International, a subsidiary set up by
Dun & Bradstreet in 1954, is the leading supplier of proprietary
information about the sales of pharmaceutical and other health care
products (Chang and Jevons Lee 1994).
6 Alternatively, one can assume that the source of heterogeneity
across buyers is V, the gross return of a successful project, which
yields qualitatively similar results, but is analytically less tractable.
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Table 1 Modeling Diagnostic Information 
Good project (G) Bad project (B) 
Positive signal (Y) Pr(V | G) Pr(V | B) 
Negative signal (N) Pr(/V | G) Pr(/V \ B) 
invests if qV > I. Information produces a signal about 
the type of the project (see Table 1). After observing 
the signal, the buyer updates his beliefs 
and decides 
whether or not to invest. 
Let Pr(Y | G) = m > 0.5 and Pr(N \ B) = n > 0.5. 
Hence, Pr(N | G) = (1 - m) and Pr(Y | B) = (1 ? n). An 
N signal conditional on a G project is also referred to 
as a "false negative," whereas a Y signal conditional 
on a B project is typically called a "false positive." 
Note that the 
"quality" of the information is given 
by m and n. Larger values of m and 
n imply a smaller 
probability of false negative and false positive, i.e., 
the 
signal is more reliable. Using Baye's Law, the prob 
ability that the project is of type G given a Y signal 
and given q is 
Vr(G\Y,q) =-, q.?-T and ^ 
mq + (l-q)(l-n) 
the probability that the project is of type G given an 
N signal and given q is 
Pr(G\N,q)- {l~m)q 
? 
(l-m)q + (l-q)n 
3.1. The Value of Information: Nonmonotonicity 
The value of information for a given buyer is the dif 
ference between his expected profits with informa 
tion and his expected profits without it. Differences 
in q translate into differences in the private benefit of 
information. However, as we shall see, higher q buy 
ers do not necessarily benefit the most from having 
the information. Because information has value inso 
far as it changes decisions, we need to consider two 
separate cases depending on whether or not the buyer 
would have invested without information. 
Case 1. qV > I, the buyer invests even without infor 
mation. In this case, the buyer values information 
because it reduces the probability of a bad investment 
Figure 1 Nonmonotonicity in the Value of Information 
I(V~I)(m + n-l)/V 
slope = -(l-m)V-(ra + n-l)/ 
decision. Given that m > 0.5, the buyer invests only 
if there is a Y signal, so that the expected profit is 
Pr(G | Y, q) Pr(Y \q)(V-I) + Pr(B | Y, q) Pr(Y | q)(-I), 
whereas the expected profit without information is 
(qV 
? 
I). The difference between the two is the value 
of information, i.e., 
W(q) = qm(V -1) + (1 - q)(l - n)(-I) 
- (qV -1) 
= nl- q[(l 
- 
m)V + (m + n 
- 
1)1]. 
Note that W(q) is equal to zero at 
ni 
V(l-m) + (m + n-l)I 
= 
q2. 
For any q > q2, Pr(B | N, q)V -1 > 0, so that even an 
N signal does not change the buyer's action (invest), 
and therefore information is valueless to such buyers. 
Case 2. qV < I, the buyer does not invest without infor 
mation. The value of information is given by W(q) = 
qm(V 
- 
I) + (1 - q)(l 
- 
n)(-I). (In this case, the 
expected profit of the buyer without information 
is 
zero.) One can rewrite this expression as W(q) = 
-(1 - n)I + q[mV -(m + n- 1)1]. Note that W(q) is 
equal to zero at 
q 
= 
(l-n)J 
mV - (m + n-1) 
= 
<h 
For any q < qx, Pr(G | Y, q)V ? I < 0, so that even 
a Y signal does not change the buyer's action (not 
invest), and therefore information is valueless to such 
buyers. 
Figure 1 shows graphically the value of informa 
tion. The intuition behind this graph is the following. 
For q > I/V, W(q) represents the saving in investment 
costs, nl(l ? q), minus the loss from a false negative 
(relative to the baseline of "invest"), (1 
- 
m)(V ? I)q. 
For this range of parameter values, the buyer val 
ues information because it could prevent (with some 
probability) a bad investment. As q rises, the cost of a 
false negative rises and the saving in investment 
cost 
decreases. For Case 2, W(q) represents the gain from 
investing (the baseline is "not invest"), mq(V 
? 
I), 
7 The quality or accuracy of the information (m and n) is assumed 
to be exogenous; the content of the information, i.e., the probability 
of getting a Y signal, does depend upon q. 
If one treats q itself as 
a random variable, then it follows that the signal and q are cor 
related. Specifically, Pr(Y | q) = mq + (1 
- 
n)q, and if q is assumed 
to be uniform between [0,1], then Pr( Y) = m/2 + (1 
- 
n)/2, so that 
Cov(Y, q) = (m + n-1)/12 > 0. If q is treated as nonstochastic, then 
the distribution of the signal depends on q. This dependence 
does 
not raise any problems because the contracting takes place 
before 
the consultant observes any signal. Thus, at the time of contracting, 
the consultant has no additional information about q. 
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Table 1 Modeling Diagnostic Information Figure 1 Nonmonotonicity in the Value of Infor t
Good project (G) Bad project (B) w
Positive signal (Y)
Negative signal (N)
Pr(Y IG)
Pr(N IG)
Pr(Y IB)
Pr(N IB)
slope = mV-(m+n-I)1
the probability that the project is of type G given an
N signal and given q is
Pr(GIN,)= (l- )q 7
q (1 - m)q + (1 - q)n
3.1. The Value of Information: Nonmonotonicity
The value of information for a given buyer is the dif-
ference between his expected profits with informa-
tion and his expected profits without it. Differences
in q translate into differences in the private benefit of
information. However, as we shall see, higher q buy-
ers do not necessarily benefit the most from having
the information. Because information has value inso-
far as it changes decisions, we need to consider t o
separate cases depending on whether or not the buyer
would have invested without information.
Case 1. qV 2: l, the buyer invests even without infor-
mation. In this case, the buyer values information
because it reduces the probability of abad investment
q
slope = -(l-m)V-(m +n-l)l
/
l/V
(1- n)l
W(q) = qm(V - I) + (1- q)(l- n)(-l) - (qV - l)
= nI - q[(l- m)V + (m + n -1)I].
I(V-I)(m+n-l)/V --_._+---~...
q= V(l- m) + (m + n -1)1 = q2'
For any q > q2' Pr(B IN, q) V - l 2: O, so that even an
N signal does not change the buyer's action (invest),
and therefore information is valueless to such buyers.
Case 2. qV < l, the buyer does not invest without infor-
mation. The value of information is given by W(q) =
qm(V - l) + (1 - q)(l - n)(-l). (In this case, the
expected profit of the buyer without information is
zero.) One can rewrite this expression as W(q) =
-(1 - n)l + q[mV - (m + n - 1)1]. Note that W(q) is
equal to zero at
Note that W(q) is equal to zero at
nI
decision. Given that m> 0.5, the buyer invests only
if there is a Y signal, so that the expected profit is
Pr(G IY, q)Pr(Y Iq)(V - l) +Pr(B IY, q)Pr(Y Iq)(-l),
whereas the expected profit without information is
(qV - I). The differ nce between the two is the value
of information, Le.,
andmqPr(G IY, q) = mq+ (1- q)(l- n)
invests if qV > l. Information produces a signal about
the type of the project (see Table 1). After observing
the signal, the buyer updates his beliefs and decides
whether or not to invest.
Let Pr(Y I G) = m > 0.5 and Pr(N I B) = n > 0.5.
Hence, Pr(N IG) = (1 - m) and Pr(Y IB) = (1 - n). An
N signal conditional on a G project is also referred to
as a "false negative," whereas a Y signal conditional
on a B project is typically called a "false positive."
Note that the "quality" of the information is given
by m and n. Larger values of m and n imply a smaller
probability of false negative and false positive, Le., the
signal is more reliable. Using Baye's Law, the prob-
ability that the project is of type G given a Y signal
and given q is
The quality or accuracy of the information (m and n) is assumed
to be exogenous; the content of the information, Le., the probability
of getting a Y signal, does depend upon q. If one treats q itself s
a random variable, then it follows that the signal and q are cor-
related. Specifically, Pr(Y Iq) mq + (1 - n)q, and if q is assumed
to be uniform between [0,1], then Pr(Y) m/2 + (1 - n)/2, s that
Cov(Y, q) = (m+n-1)/12 > O. If q is treated as nonstochastic, then
the distribution of the signal depends on q. This dependence does
not raise any problems because the contracting takes place before
the consultant observes any signa!. Thus, at the time of contracting,
the consultant has no additional information about q.
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minus the loss from a false positive, (1 
? 
n)(l ? q)I. 
Note that the gain is increasing in q, and the cost 
of a false positive is decreasing in q. In this range, 
the buyer values information because it could sug 
gest (with some probability) that investing is a good 
decision. 
Proposition 1. The value of information is nonmono 
tonic in q. It increases in q for q < I/V and decreases in q 
thereafter. 
This is an intuitive result.8 Information is more 
valuable to buyers who have the highest a priori 
uncertainty between investing or not in the project. 
Buyers who have either a highly negative or a highly 
positive ex ante expected value of the project are less 
likely to change their actions as a consequence of 
the revised probabilities, and hence will pay less for 
the information. Inasmuch as options are a substi 
tute for information, this result is also consistent with 
the conventional finding that the value of an option 
increases with the variance of the underlying asset's 
value (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). 
Remark 1. The value of information is strictly inc 
reasing in both m and n, decreasing in V and increas 
ing in I if q > I/V, and increasing in V and decreasing 
in I if q < I/V. Additionally, the value of information 
is strictly increasing in y, where 7 is a scale factor that 
multiplies both V and I. 
More precise information is more valuable. Also, 
when the underlying decision is more important (i.e., 
higher V and I), then information is more valuable. 
Remark 2. For q > I/V, dW(q)/dm > dW(q)/dn, 
and for q < I/V, dW(q)/dm < dW(q)/dn. 
In other words, all buyers on the right of I/V 
(see Figure 1) are relatively more concerned with the 
probability of a false negative, whereas all buyers on 
the left of I/V are relatively more concerned with the 
probability of a false positive. Indeed, for q > I/V, the 
baseline is to invest. These buyers are going to change 
their actions only if they observe an N signal. Hence, 
they would like the N signal be as precise as possi 
ble, i.e., the probability of a false negative, Pr(N | G) = 
1 - m, to be small. 
4. Optimal Pricing of Diagnostic 
Information 
We assume that the consultant offers only one infor 
mation quality and that such a quality is observable 
to the buyers. We discuss relaxing the first assump 
tion in ?5, and briefly discuss the latter here. In some 
cases, observing the quality of information may not be 
difficult. For instance, information might be embod 
ied in a specific piece of equipment or research tech 
nology whose characteristics are well understood. 
In other cases, although the quality of information 
is not directly observable, legal or reputation rea 
sons 
might produce a similar effect. However, when 
the production of information involves human judg 
ment based on expertise or experience (e.g., man 
agement advice), the quality of information is more 
difficult to assess. This case raises adverse selection 
problems. In addition, the consultant can also have 
incentives to distort the information if he is also 
involved in fixing the diagnosed problem or if (as is 
the case here) he receives a contingent payment. In 
this paper, we abstract from these important problems 
in information economics (Arrow 1962, Emons 1997, 
Dye and Sridhar 2003). 
Menu of Contracts. We assume that contracts are 
offered to buyers before the signal is observed and can 
include payments contingent on whether the project 
succeeds. Given that q is not observed by the con 
sultant, any contract can either have a fixed payment 
or one that is contingent on success, or both. Because 
every buyer has the same V and I, together these 
observations imply that any contract can be repre 
sented as a linear contract that combines a fixed fee 
and a payment contingent on success, i.e., royalties. 
Hence, let a contract be defined by the pair {a,?}, 
where a represents a fixed fee and ? represents a roy 
alty. We model the royalty as a share ? of project's 
(gross) returns, V, paid only if the project succeeds.9 
A pure fixed-price contract and a pure royalty con 
tract are therefore defined as {a, 0} and {0, ?}, respec 
tively. A pure fixed price means that the payment 
for the information does not vary with q. A royalty 
implies that the payment for the information is an 
increasing function of q. Hence, low q buyers tend 
to prefer a royalty scheme, whereas high q buyers 
tend to prefer a fixed price. Moreover, a royalty is 
especially ill suited to capture value from high q buy 
ers, because for these buyers the value of information 
is decreasing in q. We assume throughout the paper 
8 The standard assumption in the literature on price discrimination 
(see Tir?le 1988, Chapter 2) is that the buyers' willingness to pay 
is a monotonie function of their 
"type." As we show here, this 
assumption is implausible for diagnostic information. 
9 If investment decisions were observable, then contracts could also 
specify payments contingent on investment taking place. Note that 
investment occurs with probability mq + (1 
? 
n)(\ 
? 
q). Hence, for 
any given royalty t and a fixed price ?, each potential buyer q 
would pay ? + (1 
? 
n)tl + q(m + n 
? 
l)tl. However, this can be 
replicated with an appropriate two-part tariff, a 
= ? + (1 ? n)tI and 
? = (m + n 
- 
I)tl/Vm. A qualitatively similar alternative is to model 
outcome-contingent contracts as profit-sharing contracts where the 
consultant gets a share of the net returns, V 
? I. All contingent pay 
ment schemes create incentives for the consultant to distort infor 
mation, a possibility that we rule out by assumption. 
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minus the loss from a false positive, (1 - n)(l - q)l.
Note that the gain is increasing in q, and the cost
of a false positive is decreasing in q. In this range,
the buyer values information because it could sug-
gest (with sorne probability) that investing is a good
decision.
PROPOSITION 1. The value of information is nonmono-
tonic in q. It increases in q for q:::: l/V and decreases in q
thereafter.
This is an intuitive result.8 Information is more
valuable to buyers who have the highest a priori
uncertainty between investing or not in the project.
Buyers who have either a highly negative or a highly
positive ex ante expected value of the project are less
likely to change their actions as a consequence of
the revised probabilities, and hence will pay less for
the information. Inasmuch as options are a substi-
tute for information, this result is also consistent with
the conventional finding that the value of an option
increases with the variance of the underlying asset's
value (Dixit and Pindyck 1994).
REMARK 1. The value of information is strictly inc-
reasing in both m and n, decreasing in V and increas-
ing in l if q > l/V, and increasing in V and decreasing
in l if q < l/V. Additionally, the value of information
is strictly increasing in y, where y is a scale factor that
multiplies both V and l.
More precise information is more valuable. Also,
when the underlying decision is more important (i.e.,
higher V and I), then information is more valuable.
REMARK 2. For q > l/V, dW(q)/dm > dW(q)/dn,
and for q < l/V, dW(q)/dm < dW(q)/dn.
In other words, all buyers on the right of l/V
(see Figure 1) are relatively more concerned with the
probability of a false negative, whereas all buyers on
the left of l/V re relatively more concerned with the
probability of a false positive. Indeed, for q > l/V, the
baseline is to invest. These buyers are going to change
their actions only if they observe an N signal. Hence,
they would like the N signal be as precise as possi-
ble, i.e., the probability of a false negative, Pr(N IG) =
1 - m, to be small.
4. Optimal Pricing of Diagnostic
Information
We assume that the consultant offers only one infor-
mation quality and that such a quality is observable
to the buyers. We discuss relaxing the first assump-
tion in §5, and briefly discuss the latter here. In sorne
8 The standard assumption in the literature on price discrimination
(see Tirole 1988, Chapter 2) is that the buyers' willingness to pay
is a monotonic function of their "type." As we show here, this
assumption is implausible for diagnostic information.
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cases, observing the quality of information may not be
difficult. For instance, information might be embod-
ied in a specific piece of equipment or research tech-
nology whose characteristics are well understood.
In other cases, although the quality of information
is not directly observable, legal or reputation rea-
sons might produce a similar effect. However, when
the production of information involves human judg-
ment based on expertise or experience (e.g., man-
agement advice), the quality of information is more
difficult to assess. This case raises adverse selection
problems. In addition, the consultant can also have
incentives to distort the information if he is also
involved in fixing the diagnosed problem or if (as is
the case here) he receives a contingent payment. In
this paper, we abstract from these important problems
in information economics (Arrow 1962, Emons 1997,
Dye and Sridhar 2003).
Menu of Contracts. We a sume that contracts are
offered to buyers before the signal is observed and can
include payments contingent on whether the project
succeeds. Given that q is not observed by the con-
sultant, any contract can either have a fixed payment
or one that is contingent on success, or both. Because
every buyer has the same V and 1, together these
observations imply that any contract can be repre-
sented as a linear contract that combines a fixed fee
and a payment contingent on success, i.e., royalties.
Hence, let a contract be defined by the pair {a, j31,
where a represents a fixed fee and j3 represents a roy-
alty. We model the royalty as a share j3 of project's
(gross) returns, V, paid only if the project succeeds.9
Apure fixed-price contract and a pure royalty con-
tract are therefore defined as {a, al and {O, j31, respec-
tively. Apure fixed price means that the payment
for the information does not vary with q. A royalty
implies that the payment for the information' is an
increasing function of q. Hence, low q buyers tend
to prefer a royalty scheme, whereas high q buyers
tend to prefer a fixed price. Moreover, a royalty is
especially ill suited to capture value from high q buy-
ers, because for these buyers the value of information
is decreasing in q. We a sume throughout the paper
9 If investment decisions were observable, then contracts could also
specify payments contingent on investment taking place. Note that
investment occurs with probability rnq + (1 - n)(l - q). Hence, for
any given royalty t and a fixed price A, each potential buyer q
would pay A+ (1 - n)tI + q(rn + n - l)tI. However, this can be
replicated with an appropriate two-part tariff, a = A+(1- n)tI and
{3 = (rn +n -l)tIjVrn. A qualitatively similar alternative is to model
outcome-contingent contracts as profit-sharing contracts where the
consultant gets a share of the net returns, V - l. All contingent pay-
ment schemes create incentives for the consultant to distort infor-
mation, a possibility that we rule out by assumption.
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Figure 2 Fixed Price and Royalty 
w 
I(V-I)(m + n-\)/V 
q?OL) q2(a) 
that a and ? are nonnegative.10 Figure 2 shows an 
arbitrary fixed fee and an arbitrary royalty. 
A menu of contracts is a set of such pairs {a, ?), 
possibly one for each q. We first characterize the 
optimal menu of contracts and then we compute it 
under a special case. Note that the characterization of 
the optimal menu of contracts does not rely on any 
assumption about F(q), the distribution of q. First, it 
is useful to establish the following two properties of 
the optimal menu of contracts. 
Lemma 1. Let {a(q),?(q)}, a(q),?(q) e m+, be the 
contract designed for buyer q. 
(a) Then, for any q' > q, a(q) < a(q') and ?(q) > ?(q'). 
(b) Concavity. Take qx, q2, q3 such that qx < q2, 
q3 = Aifr + (1 
- 
k)q2 with 0 < ? < 1. Then, X[a(qx) + 
?(q1)mVq1] + (1 - \)[a(q2) + ?(q2)mVq2] < a(q3) + 
?(q3)mVq3. 
Lemma 1 implies that the amount of payments that 
the consultant can extract with an optimal menu of 
contracts must be an increasing and concave function 
of q. Buyers with larger ex ante expected values of the 
project would be asked to pay a higher price. 
Proposition 2 (Characterization of the Opti 
mal Menu of Contracts). If a,? 9?+, then the 
optimal menu of contracts consists of the following two 
contracts: a pure royalty {0; ?x) and a pure fixed price 
{a2; 0}. {0; jSa} is chosen by all q e [q\(?\), q(?\, ol2)] and 
\a2, 0} is chosen by all q e (q(?i, ot2), q2(ot2)], where 
_(1 
- 
n)I_ il(A) " 
m^-?JV-^ + n-l)!' 
ni ?oto 
?2(a2) (l-m)V + (m + n-l)I' 
a2 
and 
q(?x,a2): 
?xmV 
Figure 3 The Optimal Menu of Contracts 
w\ 
I(V-I)(m + n-\)/V[ 
Figure 3 illustrates the optimal menu of contracts. 
The intuitive argument of why the optimal menu of 
contracts collapses to only two contracts is as follows. 
Let q\ and q2 be the highest and the lowest q that buy 
the information. Given that a, ? > 0, each contract 
defines a straight line with (weakly) positive intercept 
and slope. Consider the two lines that correspond to 
the contracts offered, respectively, to q\ and q2. Due 
to incentive compatibility, these two lines mark the 
upper bound of what can be extracted from any buyer 
q e(q?, q2). The consultant cannot obtain higher prof 
its by offering other (different) contracts to the rest of 
the buyers. Hence, the optimal menu of contracts has 
only two contracts. It is now simple to see why these 
two contracts must be a pure royalty and a pure fixed 
fee. Suppose that, instead of a fixed fee, the consul 
tant uses a two-part tariff to extract value from q2. 
This contract would mark an upper bound of what 
can be extracted from any q < q2, that is, below that 
defined by a fixed-fee contract. This would reduce the 
possibilities of value extraction, and therefore cannot 
be optimal. A similar argument could be put forward 
for the pure royalty contract. Finally, note that the 
finding that high q buyers are charged a fixed fee 
and low q buyers are charged a royalty is rather intu 
itive too. Indeed, whereas a fixed fee implies that the 
payment for the information is independent of the 
ex ante expected value of the project, a royalty means 
that the payment is contingent on the success of the 
project and therefore increasing in its ex ante expected 
value. A contingent payment is therefore especially ill 
suited to capture value from buyers with high ex ante 
expected value projects, for whom information is not 
that important. The result in Proposition 2 depends 
upon key elements of our model: (a) the value of 
information is nonmonotonic in q; (b) buyers do not 
choose how much to invest in the project and all suc 
cessful projects have the same return, so that the value 
of information is (piecewise) linear in q; (c) the con 
sultant can offer only one quality level; and (d) neg 
ative payments are disallowed. In ?5, we discuss the 
robustness of Proposition 2. 
This finding has important practical implications. 
It suggests that when restricted to linear contracts, the 
10 
Negative prices are typically not observed in practice and raise a 
number of difficulties. For instance, if the consultant pays a buyer 
to use the diagnostic information and the latter only pays if they 
invest (or succeed), this may attract fraud; even those without any 
investment project would claim to be buyers, thereby hoping to get 
paid by the consultant. 
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Figure 2 Fix Prie an Royalty
w
Figure 3 The Optimal Menu of Contraets
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W(q)
tí IIVqjü
W(q)
"V-'Xm,,-"N·· ....\
q
W(q)W(q)
ü
I(V-I)(m+n-l)/V ....
that a and 13 are nonnegative. lO Figure 2 shows an
arbitrary fixed fee and an arbitrary royalty.
A menu of contracts is a set of such pairs la,f3},
possibly one for each q. We first characterize the
optimal menu of contracts and then we compute it
under a spedal case. Note that the characterization of
the optimal menu of contracts does not rely on any
assumption about F(q), the distribution of q. First, it
is useful to establish the following two properties of
the optimal menu of contracts.
LEMMA 1. Let {a(q), f3(q)}, a(q), f3(q) E ffi+, be the
contract designed for buyer q.
(a) Then,for any q' > q, a(q) :s a(q') and f3(q) ~ f3(q').
(b) Concavity. Take q1, qz, q3 such that q1 < qz,
q3 = Aq1 + (1 - A)qz with O:s A :s 1. Then, A[a(q1) +
f3(q1)mVq1] + (1 - A)[a(qz) + f3(qz)mVqz] :s a(q3) +
f3(q3)mVq3'
Le ma 1 implies that the amount of payments that
the consultant can extract with an optimal menu of
contracts must be an increasing and concave function
of q. Buyers with larger ex ante expected values of the
project would be asked to paya higher price.
PROPOSITION 2 (CHARACTERIZATION OF THE OPTI-
MAL MENU OF CONTRACTS). lf a, 13 E ffi+, then the
optimal menu of contracts consists of the following t o
contracts: a pure royalty {O; f31} and apure fixed price
laz; O}. 10; f31} is chosen by ll q E [q1(f31)' q(f31' az)] and
laz; O} is chosen by ll q E (Q(f31' az), qz(az)], wh re
(1- n)1
q1 (131) = m(l- f31)V - (m + n -1)1'
nI -az
qz z) = (1- m)V + (m+ n -1)1' and
_( ) az
q 131' az = 131 mV .
10 Negative prices are typically not observed in practice and raise a
number of difficulties. For instance, if the consultant pays a buyer
to use the diagnostic information and the latter only pays if they
invest (or succeed), this may attract fraud; even those without any
investment project would claim to be buyers, thereby hoping to get
paid by the consultant.
Figure 3 illustrates the optimal menu of contracts.
The intuitive argument of why the optimal menu of
contracts collapses to only two contracts is as follows.
Let qi and qi be the highest and the lowest q that buy
the information. Given that a, 13 > O, each contract
defines a straight line with (weakly) positive intercept
and slope. Consider the t o lines that correspond to
the contracts offered, respectively, to qi and qi. Due
to incentive compatibility, these two lines mark the
upper bound of what can be extracted from any buyer
q E (qi, qi). The consultant cannot obtain higher prof-
its by offering other (different) contracts to the rest of
the buyers. Hence, the optimal menu of contracts has
only two contracts. It is now simple to see why these
two contraets must be a pure royalty and apure fixed
fee. Suppose that, instead of a fixed fee, the consul-
tant u es a two-part tariff to extract value from qi.
This eontract would mark an upper bound of what
can be extracted from any q < qz, that is, below that
defined by a fixed-fee eontract. This would reduce the
possibilities of value extraction, and therefore cannot
be optimal. A similar argument could be put forward
for the pure royalty eontract. Finally, note that the
finding that high q buyers are eharged a fixed fee
and low q buyers are eharged a royalty is rather intu-
itive t o. Indeed, whereas a fixed fee implies that the
payment for the information is independent of the
ex ante expected value of the project, a royalty means
that the payment is contingent on the success of the
project and therefore inereasing in its ex ante expected
value. A contingent payment is therefore espedally ill
suited to capture value from buyers with high ex ante
expected value projects, for whom information is not
that important. The result in Proposition 2 depends
upon key elements of our model: (a) the value of
information is nonmonotonic in q; (b) buyers do not
ehoose how mueh to invest in the project and all sue-
eessful projeets have the same return, so that the value
of information is (pieeewise) linear in q; (e) the eon-
sultant can offer only one quality level; and (d) neg-
ative payments are disallowed. In §5, we diseuss the
robustness of Proposition 2.
This finding has important practical implieations.
It suggests that when restricted to linear contracts, the
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design of the optimal menu of contracts is rather sim 
ple (Figure 3). It suffices to offer to the buyers the 
choice between a royalty-based contract and a fixed 
fee contract, and let the buyers self-select. Buyers 
with low ex ante expected value of the project (who 
also care more about false positives) would choose 
the royalty-based contract, whereas buyers with high 
ex ante expected value of the project (who also care 
more about false negatives) would choose the fixed 
fee contract. Hence, the optimization problem of the 
consultant collapses to the choice of suitable values 
for the royalty and the fixed fee. 
One can write the consultant's profits as follows: 
nM=/ ?1mVqf(q)dq + a2f(q)dq, 
where 
(1-")J 
m(l- ?i)V -(m + n-l)I' 
??<X?= {l-m)V + {m + n-l)I' 
and 
q(?lfa2) = 
?xmV 
Solving for the first-order conditions, one can com 
pute the optimal value of ?x and a2, provided one 
knows the distribution of q and the values of V 
and I.11 
Remark 3 (Comparative Statics). Let q be unif 
ormly distributed between 0 and 1. Then, d?1/dV > 0, 
da2/dV > 0, d?l/dl < 0, da2/dl < 0, d?jdy = 0, and 
da2/dy > 0, where y is a scale factor that multiplies 
both V and I. 
The comparative statics with respect to y are easily 
understood if one thinks of a change in y as a change 
in the unit of measure of both V and I. Whereas the 
fixed price, also measured in monetary units, should 
change accordingly, the royalty, being a share, should 
not be affected. 
Remark 4 (Comparative Statics: Quality of In 
formation). Let q be uniformly distributed between 
0 and 1. Then, d?jdm > 0, da2/dm > 0, d?jdn > 0, 
and da2/dn > 0. Let m + n = constant. Then, d?1/dm < 
0 and da2/dm < 0. 
As expected, information of better quality com 
mands both a higher fixed fee and a higher royalty 
in the optimal menu of contracts. However, if one 
keeps constant the overall quality of the signal (i.e., 
the sum of false positives and false negatives is held 
constant), then information with a lower false pos 
itive rate is sold through a menu of contracts that 
involves a larger fixed fee and a larger royalty. The 
reason for this finding comes from two arguments. 
First, for any acceptable royalty, the optimal fixed fee 
is increasing in the level of the royalty because the 
residual demand is less elastic. Indeed, if the royalty 
is high, there are few buyers that switch to the roy 
alty if the consultant increases the fixed fee. Second, 
low q buyers tend to prefer a royalty and are rela 
tively more concerned with the probability of a false 
positive. So, if the false positive rate decreases, these 
buyers would obtain higher value from the informa 
tion, and the consultant would optimally increase the 
level of the royalty, which in turn would also imply a 
higher fixed fee. 
5. Robustness and Model Extensions 
We briefly discuss here the assumptions that lead to 
the major finding of this paper; that is, the optimal 
menu of contracts to sell diagnostic information is 
composed of two simple contracts, one contingent 
royalty for low q buyers, and a fixed fee for high q 
buyers.12 
First, note that we have assumed that both the roy 
alty and the fixed fee must take nonnegative values. If 
one removes this assumption, then it is easy to show 
that the optimal menu of contracts allows full value 
extraction, and it is formed by two two-part tariff 
contracts. Indeed, by precisely fine tuning the royalty 
and the fixed fee, one can design a contract that coin 
cides with the value of information for all q < 1/ V and 
another contract that does the same for all q > I/V. As 
noted earlier, allowing money transfers from the con 
sultant to the buyer is unrealistic and creates perverse 
incentives for buyers. 
Second, contracts are linear in q because V and I 
are constant across buyers. Linear contracts are stan 
dard in the literature and also correspond to the com 
mon practice in the industry. Third, the linearity of the 
value of information in q is critical for our results. 
The literature has most often analyzed models where 
the value of information is assumed to be concave 
in the buyer's type. Maintaining the nonmonotonic 
ity result, let W(q) be continuous, twice-differentiable, 
and concave between qx and q2, with a unique max 
imum at q = I/V and W(qx) = W(q2) = 0. Under the 
assumption that both the royalty and the fixed fee 
cannot take negative values, it is easy to see that the 
highest and the lowest q that buy the information will 
be offered a pure royalty and a pure fixed fee (one 
can actually perform the same type of reasoning pro 
vided in the intuition of Proposition 2). Depending 
11 For instance, let q be uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, V 
= 
$4 m and ? = $1 m. The probability of a false positive and that 
of a false negative are both 20%. Then, the optimal menu of con 
tracts is formed by a royalty of 35.4% and a fixed fee of $247,400. 
The expected profits for the consultant will amount to $80,000 per 
buyer. 
12 For the algebra, see our working paper at http://www.heinz.cmu. 
edu / wpapers / detail.jsp?id=4364. 
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design of the optimal menu of contracts is rather sim-
ple (Figure 3). It suffices to offer to the buyers the
choice between a royalty-based contract and a fixed-
fee contract, and let the buyers self-select. Buyers
with low ex ante expected value of the project (who
also care more about false positives) would choose
the royalty-based contract, whereas buyers with high
ex ante expected value of the project (who also care
more about false negatives) would choose the fixed-
fee contracto Hence, the optimization problem of the
consultant collapses to the choice of suitable values
for the royalty and the fixed fee.
One can write the consultant's profits as follows:
l Q({31,a2) lq2(a2)rrM = /31mVqj(q)dq+ ad(q)dq,q1({31) Q({31,a2)
where
(1- n)I
q1 (/31) = m(l- /31)V - (m + n -l)I'
nI -az
qz(az) = (1- m)V + (m + n -l)I' and
_( ) a2
q /31' a z = /31 mV .
Solving for the first-order conditions, one can com-
pute the optimal value of /31 and a z, provided one
knows the distribution of q and the values of V
and I.n
REMARK 3 (COMPARATIVE STATICS). Let q be unif-
ormly distributed between Oand 1. Then, J/3dJV > O,
Jaz/JV > O, J/3dJI < O, Jaz/JI < O, J/3dJy = O, and
Ja2/Jy > O, where y is a scale factor that multiplies
both V and I.
The comparative statics with respect to y are easily
understood if one thinks of a change in y as a change
in the unit of measure of both V and l. Whereas the
fixed price, also measured in monetary units, should
change accordingly, the royalty, being a share, should
not be affected.
REMARK 4 (COMPARATIVE STATICS: QUALITY OF IN-
FORMATIüN). Let q be uniformly distributed between
O and 1. Then, J/3dJm > O, Ja2/Jm > O, J/3dJn > O,
and Ja2/ Jn > O. Let m + n = constant. Then, J/3d Jm <
Oand Jaz/ Jm < O.
As expected, information of better quality com-
mands both a higher fixed fee and a higher royalty
in the optimal menu of contracts. However, if one
keeps constant the overall quality of the signal (Le.,
the sum of false positives and false negatives is held
11 For instance, let q be uniformly distributed between Oand 1, V =
$4 m and I = $1 m. The probability of a false positive and that
of a false negative are both 20%. Then, the optimal menu of con-
tracts is formed by a royalty of 35.4% and a fixed fee of $247,400.
The expected profits for the consultant will amount to $80,000 per
buyer.
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constant), then information with a lower false pos-
itive rate is sold through a menu of contracts that
involves a larger fixed fee and a larger royalty. The
reason for this finding comes from two arguments.
First, for any acceptable royalty, the optimal fixed fee
is increasing in the level of the royalty because the
residual demand is less elastic. Indeed, if the royalty
is high, there are few buyers that switch to the roy-
alty if the consultant increases the fixed fee. Second,
low q buyers tend to prefer a royalty and are rela-
tively more concerned with the probability of a false
positive. So, if the false positive rate decreases, these
buyers would obtain higher value from the informa-
tion, and the consultant would optimally increase the
level of the royalty, which in turn would also imply a
higher fixed fee.
5. Robustness and Model Extensions
We briefly discuss here the assumptions that lead to
the major finding of this paper; that is, the optimal
menu of contracts to sell diagnostic information is
composed of two simple contracts, one contingent
royalty for low q buyers, and a fixed fee for high q
buyers.1Z
First, note that we have assumed that both the roy-
alty and the fixed fee must take nonnegative values. If
one removes this assumption, then it is easy to show
that the optimal menu of contracts allows full value
extraction, and it is formed by two two-part tariff
contracts. Indeed, by precisely fine tuning the royalty
and the fixed fee, one can design a contract that coin-
cides with the value of information for all q < l/V and
another contract that does the same for all q > l/V. As
noted earlier, allowing money transfers from the con-
sultant to the buyer is unrealistic and creates perverse
incentives for buyers.
Second, contracts are linear in q because V and I
are constant across buyers. Linear contracts are stan-
dard in the literature and also correspond to the com-
mon practice in the industry. Third, the linearity of the
value of information in q is critical for our results.
The literature has most often analyzed models where
the value of information is assumed to be concave
in the buyer's type. Maintaining the nonm notonic-
ity result, let W(q) be continuous, twice-differentiable,
and concave between q1 and qz, with a unique max-
imum at q = l/V and W(q1) = W(qz) = O. Under the
assumption that both the royalty and the fixed fee
ca not take negative values, it is easy to s e that the
highest and the lowest q that buy the information will
be offered a pure royalty and apure fixed fee (one
can actually perform the same type of reasoning pro-
vided in the intuition of Proposition 2). Depending
12 For the algebra, s e our working paper at http://www.heinz.cmu.
edu/wpapers/detail.jsp?id=4364.
Arora and Fosfuri: Pricing Diagnostic Information 
Management Science 51(7), pp. 1092-1100, ?2005 INFORMS 1099 
on the slope of the value of information, these two 
contracts might again turn out to be the only two con 
tracts available in the optimal menu. However, there 
exist parameter configurations under which one can 
show that for a compact and closed set of q (strictly 
smaller than q2), the consultant offers a continuum of 
two-part tariff contracts, each of them tangent to the 
value of information. 
Because we do not assume the value of informa 
tion, but we derive it from the underlying decision 
framework, it is important to understand how one 
could obtain a value of information that is concave 
in q in our model. Note that we have assumed that 
information does not affect the level of investment, 
but only whether the investment is actually under 
taken or not. The level of investment could be a deci 
sion variable for the buyer as well. If one assumes 
that J is a decision variable and that V is an increasing 
concave function of I, then the amount invested by 
a buyer depends on q and on the information avail 
able to the buyer. Under specific functional forms one 
can show that the value of information is concave 
and nonmonotonic in q. However, in this scenario the 
royalty affects the returns of the investment, and, in 
turn, how much the buyer will invest. Therefore, the 
royalty has an additional inefficiency absent in our 
basic model. Finding the optimal menu of contracts 
under this scenario proved intractable. We do not 
think that this would make the optimal menu of con 
tracts necessarily more complex. However, the present 
model falls short of providing a thorough verification 
of this conjecture that, we hope, will be addressed in 
future research. 
Finally, we assume a single quality of informa 
tion. In the literature, typically buyers with higher 
(marginal) willingness to pay receive higher quality 
(or quantity) of the good or service. In principle, infor 
mation could be differentiated vertically (i.e., higher 
or lower overall precision) as well as horizontally 
(i.e., different combinations of false positives and false 
negatives). Differentiated quality heightens the prob 
lems of moral hazard on the part of the consultant 
if the quality is not observed by the buyer. Sarvary 
(2002) provides a treatment of vertically differenti 
ated quality. Instead, we analyzed the case of hori 
zontally differentiated quality, where the consultant 
offers two different qualities of information, i.e., sig 
nals with different combinations of m and n, with 
m + n held constant. Although the optimal menu of 
contracts changes, its main feature remains similar to 
that obtained in Proposition 2. That is, high q buyers 
will be charged a fixed fee and low q buyers will be 
charged a pure royalty. For q in-between, either a fixed 
fee or a pure royalty may be charged, depending on 
parameter values. Further, high q buyers purchase the 
signal with the smaller probability of a false negative 
and low q buyers purchase the signal with the smaller 
probability of a false positive. Obviously, increasing 
the number of different qualities of information avail 
able leads to an expansion of the optimal menu of 
contracts, but once again, each element of the optimal 
menu is either a pure royalty or a pure fixed fee. We 
conjecture that allowing for more variants will yield 
similar results: more pricing options, but each option 
being either a pure fixed fee or a pure royalty. 
We have explored the robustness of our result in 
other ways as well. In an early version of this paper, 
we analyzed a specification of the model where buy 
ers' heterogeneity came through the returns of a good 
project rather than the probability of a good project. 
This specification is less tractable, but nonetheless 
yields similar results. 
We also analyzed an extension where we have 
competition among two consultants. When the con 
sultants sell identical quality, the standard Bertrand 
result holds where price competition leads to zero 
profits. However, when the information is differenti 
ated, i.e., each consultant has a different combination 
of m + n, we find that consultants tend to choose dif 
ferent pricing mechanisms to alleviate competition. 
6. Conclusion 
Diagnostic information that simply changes the esti 
mates of the probabilities of the different states of 
nature has economic value if the decision maker 
would change his actions as a consequence of the 
revised probabilities. However, trading information is 
not easy, and although Arrow (1962) envisaged the 
possibility of information becoming a commodity, he 
also warned about the impediments to markets for 
information. We do not dispute the existence of such 
problems. However, as the examples such as market 
ing research, independent financial research, and legal 
advice have shown, there are markets, albeit imper 
fect, for information. In this paper, we have tried to 
understand how these markets work and, in particu 
lar, how information is priced. 
We have found that the buyer's willingness to 
pay for information is nonmonotonic in the buyer's 
"type," implying that the standard "revelation mecha 
nism" solution cannot be mechanically applied. How 
ever, the optimal pricing scheme for a monopolist 
information owner turned out to be extremely sim 
ple. A pure royalty is offered to buyers whose projects 
have low ex ante expected value and a pure fixed fee 
is offered to buyers whose projects have high ex ante 
expected value. 
Subject to the caveats discussed earlier, this find 
ing has important practical implications. In par 
ticular, when diagnostic information affects mainly 
whether an investment takes place, but not the size 
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on the slope of the value of information, these two
contracts might again turn out to be the only two con-
tracts available in the optimal menu. However, there
exist parameter configurations under which one can
show that for a compact and closed set of q (strictly
smaller than qi), the consultant offers a continuum of
two-part tariff contracts, each of them tangent to the
value of information.
Because we do not assume the value of informa-
tion, but we derive it from the underlying decision
framework, it is important to understand how one
could obtain a value of information that is concave
in q in our model. Note that we have assumed that
information does not affect the level of investment,
but only whether the investment is actually under-
taken or noto The level of investment could be a deci-
sion variable for the buyer as well. If one a sumes
that I is a decision variable and that V is an increasing
concave function of I, then the amount invested by
a buyer depends on q and on the information avail-
able to the buyer. Under specific functional forms one
can show that the value of information is concave
and nonmonotonic in q. However, in this scenario the
royalty affects the returns of the investment, and, in
turn, how much the buyer will invest. Therefore, the
royalty has an additional inefficiency absent in our
basic model. Finding the optimal menu of contracts
under this scenario proved intractable. We do not
think that this would make the optimal menu of con-
tracts necessarily more complexo However, the present
model falls short of providing a thorough verification
of this conjecture that, we hope, will be addressed in
future research.
Finally, we a sume a single quality of informa-
tion. In the literature, typically buyers with higher
(marginal) willingness to pay receive higher quality
(or quantity) of the good or service. In principIe, infor-
mation could be differentiated vertically (Le., higher
or lower overall precision) as well as horizontallY
(Le., different combinations of false positives and false
negatives). Differentiated quality heightens the prob-
lems of moral hazard on the part of the consultant
if the quality is not observed by the buyer. Sarvary
(2002) provides a treatment of verticallY differenti-
ated quality. Instead, we analyzed the case of hori-
zontally differentiated quality, where the consultant
offers two different qualities of information, Le., sig-
nals with different combinations of m and n, with
m + n held constant. Although the optimal menu of
contracts changes, its main feature remains similar to
that obtained in Proposition 2. That is, high q buyers
will be charged a fixed fee and low q buyers will be
charged a pure royalty. For q in-between, either a fixed
fee or a pure royalty may be charged, depending on
parameter values. Further, high q buyers purchase the
signal with the smaller probability of a false negative
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and low q buyers purchase the signal with the smaller
probability of a false positive. Obviously, increasing
the number of different qualities of information avail-
able leads to an expansion of the optimal menu of
contracts, but once again, each element of the optimal
menu is either a pure royalty or apure fixed fee. We
conjecture that allowing for more variants will yield
similar results: more pricing options, but each option
being either apure fixed fee or a pure royalty.
We have explored the robustness of our result in
other ways as well. In an early version of this paper,
we analyzed a specification of the model where buy-
ers' heterogeneity carne through the returns of a good
project rather than the probability of a good project.
This specification is less tractable, but nonetheless
yields similar results.
We also analyzed an extension where we have
competition among two consultants. When the con-
sultants sell identical quality, the standard Bertrand
result holds where price competition leads to zero
profits. However, when the information is differenti-
ated, Le., each consultant has a different combination
of m + n, we find that consultants tend to choose dif-
ferent pricing mechanisms to alleviate competition.
6. Conclusion
Diagnostic information that simply changes the esti-
mates of the probabilities of the different states of
nature has economic value if the decision maker
would change his actions as a consequence of the
revised probabilities. However, trading information is
not easy, and although Arrow (1962) envisaged the
possibility of information becoming a commodity, he
also warned about the impediments to markets for
information. We do not dispute the existence of such
problems. However, as the examples such as market-
ing research, independent financial research, and legal
advice have shown, there are markets, albeit imper-
fect, for information. In this paper, we have tried to
understand how these markets work and, in particu-
lar, how information is priced.
We have found that the buyer's willingness to
pay for information is nonmonotonic in the buyer's
"type," implying that the standard "revelation mecha-
nism" solution ca not be mechanically applied. How-
ever, the optimal pricing scheme for a monopolist
information owner turned out to be extremely sim-
ple. A pure royalty is offered to buyers whose projects
have low ex ante expected value and apure fixed fee
is offered to buyers whose projects have high ex ante
expected value.
Subject to the caveats discussed earlier, this find-
ing has important practical implications. In par-
ticular, when diagnostic information affects mainly
whether an investment takes place, but not the size
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of the investment, so that the value of information 
is approximately linear, our results suggest that con 
sultants do not need complicated pricing schemes 
to maximize profits. It suffices to offer the buyers a 
choice between a royalty-based contract and a fixed 
fee contract, and let the buyers self-select. Buyers 
with low ex ante expected value of the project would 
choose the royalty-based contract, whereas buyers 
with high ex ante expected value of the project would 
choose the fixed-fee contract. Hence, the optimization 
problem of the seller collapses to the choice of suitable 
values for the royalty and the fixed fee. 
An online appendix to this paper is available at 
http://mansci.pubs.informs.org/ecompanion.html. 
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